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This paper reports on a survey of primary public and private schools in rural Pakistan with a 
focus on student achievement as measured through test scores. Absolute learning is low 
compared to curricular standards and international norms. Tested at the end of the third grade, 
a bare majority have mastered the K-I mathematics curriculum and 31 percent can correctly 
form a sentence with the word “school” in the vernacular (Urdu). As in high-income coun-
tries, bivariate comparisons show that higher learning is associated with household wealth and 
parental literacy. In sharp contrast to high-income countries, these gaps decrease dramatically 
in a multivariate regression and once we look at differences between children in the same 
school. Consequently, the largest gaps are between schools. The gap in English test-scores 
between government and private schools, for instance, is 12 times the gap between children 
from rich and poor families. To contextualize these results within a broader South-Asian 
context, we use data from public schools in the state of Uttar Pradesh in India. Levels of 
learning and the structure of the educational gaps are similar in the two samples. As in Paki-
stan, absolute learning is low and the largest gaps are between schools: the gap between good 
and bad government schools, for instance, is 5 times the gap between children with literate 
and illiterate mothers. 
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1. Introduction 
Three million children were born in Pakistan in 1990, the majority in rural regions. By 2005, 
these children were at the doorstep of adulthood and 80 percent had completed all the formal 
schooling they would receive during their lifetime. The better educated arrived at this threshold 
with numerous advantages—they would earn higher wages in the labor market and enjoy better 
health outcomes, and the educational and health outcomes of their children would be substantially 
better than their own. More educated girls, although they may not participate actively in the labor 
market, would command greater autonomy and marry into higher socioeconomic groups. Even 
among children with the same level of formal schooling, those with more learning (as measured 
through test scores) would be at an advantage—a study of adult workers in Pakistan showed that 
literacy and numeracy had a higher return than primary school completion (Nasir and Nazli 
2000). 
 
Part of what determines a person’s educational status is the time she spends in school, and this 
has been the focus of most educational research in Pakistan. Recent studies point to low educa-
tional participation, both in absolute terms and relative to the average income of the country 
(World Bank, 2003, World Bank 2005). With an adult literacy rate of 44 percent, Pakistan com-
pares poorly to the South Asian average (54 percent), and in 2001-02, net-enrollment was 51 
percent compared to 83 percent for India, 90 percent for Sri-Lanka and 70 percent for Nepal. For 
the country’s level of income, the forecasted net enrollment rate (based on a regression of primary 
net enrollment on log per-capita income and the square of log per-capital income for 138 coun-
tries) is 77 percent: Pakistan’s net enrollment is below what one expects for its level of income. 
Research also suggests that this low participation has a strong gender component (girls are less 
likely to go to school), is linked to the distance from schools (more so for girls than boys), and to 
the wealth and educational attainment of the child’s parents (Holmes, 2003, Lloyd, Mete and 
Sathar, 2005, Alderman, Orazem and Paterno, 2001). 
 
While we do know how many years children spend in school (and what determines the extent of 
their participation), we know little about how much they learn during this time. Household sur-
veys reveal who joins schools, which children drop out and when, but say less about the basic 
competencies in language and numeracy that children acquire in school. Data requirements partly 
drive this emphasis—it is easier to ask about school enrollment than to test children. But it is also 
driven by educational policy. For example, the Millennium Development Goals call for universal      
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primary education and equal enrollments among girls and boys, but say nothing about learning 
and competency. Similarly, a number of educational interventions focus on getting children into 
schools (midday meals, free textbooks, stipends for girls are all examples from very recent his-
tory) but do not monitor what these children learn and what effect these interventions have on 
their learning.  
 
This may be a mistake. Although all children in Pakistan may be enrolled in primary schools by 
2015, many may complete their education functionally illiterate and innumerate. International 
assessments of learning show that many low-income nations perform far below the mean for 
OECD countries (Mullis and others 2004). Furthermore, improving the quality of schooling may 
in itself be one of the best ways of getting children into school in the first place—after all, the 
returns on parental investment depend both on how much a child learns and the number of years 
she stays in school.  
 
This paper reports on an independent survey of primary schools in rural Pakistan with a focus on 
the achievement of enrolled children, as measured through test scores. The first part of the paper 
looks at levels of learning. It gives a sense not only of “average learning” (as in reports from 
worldwide comparisons), but also points to the specific knowledge that children acquire in 
school. That is, we look at whether children can add 5+14 and whether they can make a sentence 
with the word “ball”. Usually, tests administered in Pakistan take the curriculum as their starting 
point for test design. When children perform far below the curriculum level, the results are re-
ported as “not achieving the desired competency”, leaving the question of what these children 
actually know unanswered. In contrast, the tests presented here start from the basics (counting 




The second part of the paper presents associations between children’s learning levels and their 
attributes. We first construct an overall test score from the individual test questions. That is, we 
“norm” the test by weighting test questions according to difficulty using Item Response Theory, 
the established procedure in the international testing literature; this is discussed further below. 
                                                      
1 There are several reasons for using knowledge-specific tests rather than other secondary data. In a number 
of tests available to us, the data for these three exercises are not available: we do not have access to the 
original questions used for a number of tests (and in some cases these are proprietary), the secondary data 
are presented as test-score “totals” rather than question-by-question responses, which does not allow us to 
construct the item response scores.       
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Using the weighted test score, we identify learning “gaps” across households (parental wealth and 
education), children (age and gender), schools (public/private), and geographical locations.  
 
There are three take-home messages. The “bad” news is that children know little relative to what 
they need to know to function in society and relative to their curriculum. By the end of Grade III, 
a bare majority have mastered the mathematics curriculum for Grade I. They can add double digit 
numbers and subtract single-digit numbers but they cannot do much more. They cannot subtract 
double-digit numbers, they cannot tell the time, and multiplication and division are beyond reach 
for all except a tiny minority. In Urdu, they cannot form a sentence with the word “school” or the 
word “beautiful”. Less than 20 percent can comprehend a simple paragraph in the vernacular. For 
the 40 percent of boys and 50 percent of girls who either never attend school or dropout by the 
end of Grade III, this is all the learning they will receive from their formal schooling for the 
remainder of their lives. 
 
The first part of the “good” news is that differences across schools account for at least 50 percent 
of the overall variation in test scores. While there are differences across children from different 
parental backgrounds (children from wealthier backgrounds or with more educated parents know 
more), these differences are dwarfed by those across government and private schools and across 
good and bad government schools. In English, the difference between children in private and 
government schools is twelve times as large as the difference between children from poor and 
non-poor households after controlling for observed differences between children.  
 
However, not all government schools are the same—the difference in learning between a high-
performing and a low-performing government school is twenty-four times the difference between 
children from poor and non-poor backgrounds after controlling for observed child-level differ-
ences. Unlike in high-income countries where household factors are critical, the primacy of 
schools in Pakistan suggests that improvements in learning can be achieved through policies 
targeted at the school level. In the United States for instance, 20-25 percent of the achievement 
gap in black-white test-score gap arises from parenting practices at home (Jencks and Phillips 
1998). Designing government policies that influence parents to improve their parenting practices 
are clearly harder than designing government policies that (say) influence teachers to come to 
school. Some governments can fire some teachers. No government can fire parents. 
 
The second part of the “good” news is that this variation across schools is not due to differences      
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across villages; indeed the largest differences are between schools in the same village, so that 
there are some good (and some bad) schools in every village. The policy implications are stark. If 
factors across villages drive variation in learning, district education boards, the educational at-
mosphere in the village and local returns to education, all of which are difficult to change, play an 
important role. The findings suggest that there are no “bad” villages and “good” villages; to 
improve learning, we need focus only on the characteristics of schools. 
 
This paper does not address what school characteristics to focus on. A long history of research on 
learning achievement and school inputs points to technical and methodological issues that se-
verely bias our understanding of the relationship between school inputs and learning achievement 
and we believe that a responsible answer is best left to further research. Towards the end of the 
paper, we speculate though, that the large differences across schools reflect differences in teacher 
commitment and motivation—whether children learn in government schools largely depends on 
whether their teachers are heroes or zeros. 
 
Very low learning achievement is not a Pakistan-specific problem and requires a serious South-
Asia wide policy response. The parallel analysis with data on government schools from the state 
of Uttar Pradesh in India helps contextualize the results from Pakistan within a broader South-
Asian context. Contrary to the popular picture of Pakistan as a “failed-state” (Singer, 2001) and 
the popular “India-Shining” slogan, levels and patterns of learning are very similar. Children 
know little and most variation is across schools rather than across households: the gap in learning, 
for instance, between a child in a high-performing and a low-performing government school is 
five times the gap in learning between a child with a literate mother and a child with an illiterate 
mother.
2 Given the commonalities across the two countries, the analysis sheds some light on the 
necessary ingredients for a system of monitoring performance and learning; this is discussed in 
                                                      
2 The results presented here are thus not meant as a comparison of performance in the two countries. The 
studies were independently designed with inherently different purposes. Consequently, the tests are differ-
ent (and not comparable), the studies sample different portions of the relevant population, and the grades 
tested are different (third grade in Pakistan and fourth grade in India). Nevertheless, there are several 
reasons for using these data rather than other secondary data. In a number of tests available to us, the data 
for our analysis are not available: we do not have access to the original questions (and in some cases these 
are proprietary), the secondary data are presented as test-score “totals” rather than question-by-question 
responses, which does not allow us to construct the item response scores, and household attributes are not 
available in some cases. Furthermore, we cannot find any tests in India that allow us to replicate the analy-
sis in Pakistan—there have been almost no large-scale tests of children in rural private schools (Pratham, 
2006 is an exception); furthermore, samples have usually been drawn by picking a single school in every 
village so that comparisons across schools within the same village are not possible. 
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Section 6. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews what we know about 
learning from the existing literature. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 outlines 
what children know in language and numeracy, and section 5 presents a decomposition of the 
variation in learning and a discussion of the patterns that emerge. Section 6 concludes with three 
puzzles and questions for future research. 
2. Literature Review 
Since 1984 various agencies have conducted (at least) 19 assessments of primary education in 
Pakistan (Table 1). These efforts gained momentum after the World Declaration on Education for 
All (EFA) in 1990 and again with the joint UNESCO-UNICEF global initiative for Monitoring 
Learning Achievement in 1996. Two major assessments—the World Bank’s Primary Education 
Project in 1984 and the BRIDGES project (Harvard Institute of International Development) in 
1988–89 set the stage for a slew of surveys in the following decade. Both these projects assessed 
a large number of students (3,300 for the WB project and 11,000 under the BRIDGES) using the 
same test.  
 
There were some noteworthy results (Shah 1984). In three tested provinces, girls scored higher in 
sciences while boys scored higher in mathematics. However, all groups performed poorly, lead-
ing the author to conclude that schools should focus on ensuring that students acquire basic 
competencies rather than increasing “peripheral luxuries” in the curriculum. In 1989, when the 
BRIDGES project retested children with the same test instrument, they found that performance 
had declined in the intervening five years. A clear message emerged: learning in Pakistani 
schools was a problem, and the experience of the last five years was an early warning that time 
alone would not yield better educated children.  
 
Testing activity in Pakistan increased significantly during the 1990s and largely replicated the 
disappointing results of the 1980s in terms of children’s learning. Some new results about the 
variations in school performance emerged. Different types of schools produced very different 
results, although there was little correlation between achievement scores and per-student costs 
(Mirza and Hameed 1994).  
 
Not surprisingly, different agents had very different perceptions of what was wrong with the      
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system. Head-teachers criticized the standard of teaching, teacher absenteeism, and the lack of 
parental support at home. Teachers blamed low performance on the lack of adequate facilities and 
physical resources. Learning coordinators focused on the poor physical resources, teacher absen-
teeism, poor school administration and the lack of cooperation between teachers and the commu-
nity (Arif and others 1999; Haque and others 2000, The Bureau of Curriculum Development and 
Extension Services, NWFP 1999; and the Bureau of Curriculum and Extension Centre, Balochis-
tan 2000). One study at least, did find that teachers matter—the Multi-Donor Support Unit for the 
Social Action Program in 1995 collected information on 11,563 students in 527 schools through-
out the country and reported that teacher performance, as measured through test scores was 
positively correlated with student scores. This effect was particularly pronounced in rural areas 
where trained teachers accounted for a 12-percent increase in student scores. Finally, private 
schools were doing better. Both in the Multi-Donor Support Unit test and a later test conducted 
by Action Aid, children in private schools performed significantly better than those in public 
schools, and in all subjects. 
 
Despite the somewhat bewildering array of tests and outcomes, the lack of coordination between 
different testing bodies severely limits the ability to draw meaningful inferences. Consequently, 
over the past 15 years we do not know whether performance has improved, whether provincial 
differences in achievement have declined (Khan 1995), or whether increasing enrollments have 
had an impact on learning. As Table 1 shows, the available documentation is simply inadequate.
3 
Even an educated guess at the answer to these pressing questions is impossible. Similarly, while 
some of the tests document gender differences (with differing results for different subjects), there 
has been no attempt to examine the variation in test scores along other dimensions—do children 
in rich families perform better than in poor families? What about in poor and rich villages? Or in 
families with literate/illiterate mothers? These gaps, which are the mainstay of educational policy 
in OECD countries, remain understudied. 
 
The current state of knowledge regarding learning achievement in India is similarly hampered by 
a lack of coordination and systematization of testing tools, sampling, and reporting protocols. A 
                                                      
3 In Assessing Learning Achievement, the UNESCO (2001) specifies that a “good survey” should include 
at the very minimal, careful documentation of the sampling methodology (with standard errors), as well as 
instrument construction and validation. Although we are currently in the process of trying to contact each 
individual author to update this review, in a number of cases, instruments have been discarded and pub-
lished documents remain the only source of information. These documents provide little more than the 
information summarized in Table 1.      
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number of studies since the early 1990s report low achievement levels at the terminal grades of 
primary school. Examples include a large national study by the National Center for Educational 
Research and Training (NCERT) in 1994, which found that children scored an average of 47 
percent in language and 41 percent in mathematics (Shukla and others 1994) and state-wise 
studies with smaller samples in Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Delhi and Madhya Pradesh (Bashir 1994; 
Hasan 1995; Govinda and Varghese 1993; Aggarwal 2000). A recent survey tested children from 
almost all districts from India and reports low levels of learning with substantial variation across 
states: 52 percent of children between the ages of 7 and 10 could read a small paragraph with 
short sentences at Grade I difficulty levels, 32 percent could read a story text and 54 percent were 
unable to divide or subtract (Pratham, 2005). 
 
There is little consensus across these studies on the nature and extent of socio-demographic 
variation in achievement levels. In some studies, boys and students from upper castes perform 
better (Shukla and others 1994; Aggarwal 2000; Aikara 1997), while in others there are no gender 
differences (Hasan 1995). As in Pakistan, private schools outperformed government schools 
(Kingdon 1996; Tooley and Dixon 2006; ASER 2005). Most studies find that home background 
and school factors were both important in influencing students’ learning (Kingdon 1996; Govinda 
and Varghese 1993).
 4  
 
Thus, even though there has been a greater number of studies measuring learning in India, mean-
ingful comparisons can be made neither across studies nor over time because of differences in 
sampling methodology, the tests used and the child characteristics collected as part of the survey.
5 
As in Pakistan, there is no comprehensive picture of variation in achievement across relevant 
socioeconomic dimensions. For instance, the lack of consensus on gender and caste differences 
could reflect different test instruments and different sampling methodologies. In short, in both 
countries, it is hard to draw any straightforward inferences on either changes in learning over time 
or the gaps in learning across different groups. 
                                                      
4 Although Kingdon (1996) looks at the impact of various student characteristics (wealth, gender, and 
parental education) and school characteristics on learning, the data is restricted to a sample of urban schools 
from one city in north India. 
5 Even though ASER (2005) allows one to compare learning achievements across districts/states in India at 
a point in time, there is no information collected on household characteristics. If repeated at regular inter-
vals with a standardized instrument, this initiative would be a welcome addition to what we know about 
learning in Indian schools.      
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3. The Study Sample and Tests 
3.1. Pakistan 
The Learning and Educational Achievement in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) project in Pakistan 
carried out the tests analyzed here, with an eye toward piloting new educational interventions. 
Previous work by the project team documented a sea change in the delivery of education in the 
country (Andrabi and others 2004, 2005, forthcoming). Despite concerns about high and rising 
enrollments in religious schools, or madrassas, the team estimated that less than 1 percent of 
children are enrolled in madrassas and found no evidence of an increase in religious enrollments 
during the 1990s. Instead, there had been an explosion in private schools during the 1990s, which 
shows no signs of slowing down.
6  The LEAPS project was conceived as a multiyear study to 
pilot potential interventions and document the efficacy of various policies in an environment 
where villages had both private and public schools. The results presented here draw from the 
baseline survey of this project. 
 
The team purposively chose three districts in Punjab on the basis of an accepted stratification of 
the province into North, Central, and South. Within these three districts—Attock in the North, 
Faisalabad in the Center and Rahim Yar Khan in the South—126 villages (42 in each) were 
chosen randomly from a list frame of all villages with at least one private school. In subsequent 
visits, 14 villages were eliminated and for the remaining 112 villages, the team mapped all exist-
ing schools, defining catchments as a 15-minute circle from the boundary of the village in Attock 
and Faisalabad (where the villages are concentrated) and a 30-minute circle in Rahim Yar Khan 
(where they are more spread out).
7 The mapping exercise yielded 828 schools, for an average of 8 
public and private schools in every village.
8 
 
All children enrolled in third grade in these public and private schools were tested in Urdu, 
                                                      
6 Of all new private schools in 2000 50 percent were set up in villages, were relatively cheap (with a fee to 
median GNI ratio of 2.5 percent compared to 9 percent for the United States), and their largest growth 
sector was the rural poor. By 2010, the team projected that in Punjab province (the largest in the country 
with 50 percent of the population) one-half of all villages would have at least one private school. 
7 In the villages that were dropped, either the population in these villages was too large (they were cities) or 
the private schools had shut down. 
8 This simple mapping exercise dramatically alters the vision of a village with a single school. The large 
number of schools is not because of the sampling strategy; a mapping exercise in the rural parts of the 
Sindh province (one of the poorest in the country) shows that there is an average of five government 
schools in every village. Anecdotal evidence from India suggests similar numbers, although there is cur-
rently no analysis that allows us to estimate the average number of schools (government and private) in a 
village.      
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Mathematics, and English.
9 The test was developed one year before it was administered and 
piloted extensively in rural and urban schools (Andrabi and others, 2002, for the test validation 
and documentation).
10 Two members of the LEAPS team monitored students during testing, and 
the children’s teacher was not allowed in the same room. Finally, for a sub-sample of 10 ran-
domly selected children in every school, we also completed a child questionnaire with basic 
information about the child’s parents, ownership of certain assets, the distance to school and the 
number of siblings. We thus have test scores in three subjects for over 12,000 and combined test-
scores and child characteristics for 6,241 children. 
 
The sample of children is representative of children enrolled in third grade in a village with a 
private school in Punjab.
11 In 2000, 30 percent of all villages in Punjab province (and 50 percent 
of the population, since private schools disproportionately locate in larger villages) satisfied this 
restriction; it is likely that this has increased by another 10 percentage points by 2005. The par-
ticular strategy affords several advantages, in that we are able to compare performance across 
schools in the same village, and therefore understand the extent to which learning is driven by 
school-related factors that vary across villages and across schools in the same village.  
 
3.2. India 
The comparison sample from India is based on data from 31 districts in Uttar Pradesh and 9 
districts in Madhya Pradesh (Table 3). Within each district, one “block” (several blocks comprise 
a district) was chosen randomly and within each block, five “Gram Panchayats” (henceforth GP) 
were chosen randomly.
12 The choice of districts was purposive, rather than random and sought to 
examine the effect of past institutions on the quality of public services delivered (Pandey 2005). 
A second set of districts were those that lay on either side of the border of MP and UP. 
                                                      
9 Children from Grade 3 were chosen so that we could follow them for 2 years (till the end of Grade 5) 
before the transition to middle and secondary schooling. Since there are fewer government middle and 
secondary school, this often means that children study outside the village, which makes the construction of 
a panel of test-scores on the same children a daunting task. 
10 The test used the K-V curriculum as a starting point but did not use the K-V textbooks for the test-design. 
In the pilot, we noticed that children could verbatim repeat paragraphs from a textbook “as-if” they were 
reading them; in fact they were not—through the year, they had memorized the paragraph verbatim from 
the textbook. The test-design used here thus tests the curricular concepts developed by the Ministry of 
Education. 
11 Punjab is economically and educationally the most dynamic province in the country with systematically 
higher enrollments, lower dropouts and greater income than households in other provinces. Within Punjab, 
villages with private schools tend to be larger, more educated and wealthier than those without (Table 2).  
12 A gram panchayat (GP) is an administrative unit between a block and a revenue village. A GP comprises 
2-3 revenue villages on average and the local village level government is formed at the GP level.      
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In each GP, one government school at the primary level (up to fifth grade) was followed from 
August 2002 until February 2003. In cases where there were two or more public schools provid-
ing primary schooling in the GP, one was randomly chosen. Each sample school was visited 
unannounced seven to eight times during this period by field investigators. In each of these visits, 
the survey team recorded the presence (or absence) of each teacher and his/her teaching activity, 
defined broadly to include teaching, writing on the board, supervising written work and keeping 
order in classroom.  
 
Further, in every school a randomly chosen sample of ten children in fourth grade was followed 
during the survey period and, toward the end of the survey, the sampled children in the fourth 
grade were tested in literacy (Hindi) and numeracy; the test was based on the starting material of 
textbooks used in these schools.
1314 The students were tested near the completion of their fourth 
grade. Since students are randomly chosen and the sample covers 40 districts, the sample is 
somewhat representative of public school children in rural north India. 
4. What Do Children Know? 
Table 4 documents the state of learning among children close to completing the third grade in 
Pakistan with a comparison of similar questions for the tested children in India. In Mathematics, 
children tested in both India and Pakistan can add single and double digit numbers. But results for 
other mathematical operations are poor: In Pakistan, a bare majority (65 percent) can subtract 
single-digit numbers (8 – 3), and less than one-third can subtract 3-digit numbers; in India 53 
percent of all tested children could subtract 112 from 640 (640–112). Among the Pakistani chil-
dren, 59 percent could multiply two single-digit numbers (5 x 4); in India 49 percent could multi-
ply two-digit numbers (45 x 12) and 41 percent could perform a simple division exercise (936 
÷3). The last column in Table 4 shows the grade-level equivalent using the curricular standards 
developed by the Pakistani Ministry of Education (Government of Pakistan 2000). By the end of 
Grade III, a bare majority have achieved Grade K & I competencies and less than 20 percent are 
anywhere close to what is expected of them according to the curriculum. 
 
                                                      
13 In public schools in UP and MP, Hindi is the only language taught between first and fifth grade. 
14 To ensure that enrollment does not decrease below an official norm, teachers in rural public schools 
sometimes maintain inflated school registers that include the names of children who have dropped out or 
have left to go to another school. Before randomly choosing the ten children per school, these children were 
excluded from the list-frame.      
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These results measure the extent of learning after spending four years in the education system in 
Pakistan and five years in India. Although the test went on to ask about division and simple 
fractions, these questions were simply out of the grasp of the vast majority of children. There 
were five students who scored more than 90 percent; but that only 19 percent knew how to divide 
384 by 6 (Pakistan) suggests that these children were truly exceptional. In terms of the curriculum 
standards, most children were just at the benchmarks proposed by the curriculum wing for chil-
dren in first grade in the case of Pakistan and second grade for India. 
 
The results in English (Pakistan only) were equally poor (Table 5). Most children (86 percent) 
could recognize and write an alphabet when spoken and 70 percent could fill in a blank alphabet 
in a sequence (D _ F) but less than 50 percent could complete basic words like BALL or FLAG 
when given a picture and asked to fill in 2 blanks (BA_ _) or a single blank (FLA_). Indeed, for 
the latter only 29 percent were able to correctly fill in the blank. Again, the test went on to check 
children’s ability to construct more complicated words and sentences as well as paragraph com-
prehension, but as in Mathematics, these concepts were too advanced for 90 percent of the chil-
dren tested. 
 
English is conceivably a language for the elite and to enjoy the benefits of reading and writing a 
basic knowledge of the vernacular may be sufficient. Unfortunately, the scores from the Urdu test 
(Pakistan) suggest that children are equally disadvantaged in the vernacular as they are in Eng-
lish. A minority of children can form basic sentences in Urdu given a word; only 31 percent can 
form a sentence using “school.” Levels are similar in India—only 30 percent of the tested chil-
dren could construct a sentence in Hindi using a commonly used word like “message” and a 
minority (46 percent) was able to use the word “house” in a sentence.  
 
These numbers suggest that the average citizen in Pakistan (or India) will be in no position to 
compete in a rapidly globalizing world. Although international comparisons are inexact, in the 
case of Mathematics the recently completed Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS) gives a sense of where the children we tested fall in the global distribution. For 
instance, 72 percent of fourth-graders correctly answered the question 15 x 9 internationally 
compared to the 50 percent who could answer 32 x 4 in Pakistan (the former is a tougher question 
since it requires a “carry-over”); 73 percent could graphically represent simple information (bar 
charts) internationally compared to less than 10 percent in Pakistan. Both in India and Pakistan, 
average levels of learning are at the bottom of the international chart.      
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We might be tempted to counter the observation that only 50 percent of third-graders can com-
pute 32 x 4 by pointing out that in Australia, New Zealand, and Norway, less than 45 percent of 
fourth-graders could compute 15 x 9. This is a near-sighted argument. The key difference be-
tween Pakistan and India and the low-performing OECD countries is the length of time that 
children stay in school. Household data suggest that 40 percent of all children in Pakistan and 42 
percent in India will have completed their formal schooling history by third grade (Pakistan) and 
fourth grade (India). In contrast, nearly all children in the three OECD countries will complete the 
twelfth grade. And low achievement observed in fourth grade (largely due to a curriculum de-
signed to enhance creative thinking at the lower grades) will be more than compensated by accel-
erated learning later on—by the time these children are in seventh grade, they score above the 
international average. By comparison, close to one-half of the 3 million born in Pakistan will 
leave school unable to add, subtract, multiply or divide; unable to read and write simple sentences 
in Urdu; and unable to read a short word like “BALL” in English. 
5. The Educational Gaps 
A second basic characterization of the data decomposes these averages into differences across 
population subgroups. Subgroup decompositions—say along income or ethnicity—have played a 
critical role in policy and educational legislation in the United States. For instance, the black-
white test-score gap—17-year-old blacks score roughly one standard deviation lower on the 
NAEP math test than their white peers (Hanushek 2001)—has spurred a large body of research 
and widespread legislation on financial equalization across public schools. Equally, the gender 
gap in mathematics and science has been the focus of much recent discussion. There are two 
issues—one methodological and one technical—we address prior to a discussion of the test-score 
gaps. 
 
On a methodological note, a key question is the choice of subgroups. Should we look at rich and 
poor families or gaps across girls and boys? Or should we concentrate on differences across the 
landed and landless? Following established norms and new literature on the equality of opportu-
nity, we focus on two subgroups. Our first set of subgroup decompositions are for immutable 
characteristics such as gender, and arguably parental literacy and income. On moral grounds, we 
may believe that differences across children in these attributes should not affect their opportuni-
ties in life.  
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The second set of decompositions is along geographical lines. A guiding principle of most public 
education systems is that of standardization and equity. Indeed, in Pakistan, as in most other 
countries including India, inputs into the educational system are driven by this principle—salaries 
for teachers for example are dictated almost entirely by experience rather than ability or motiva-
tion. The principle of “equality” may also imply that outcomes, and in this case, a child’s learning 
be the same, regardless of the village she is born in or the public school she attends. Thus, in 
addition to child characteristics, we also look at differences across villages and across schools 
within the same village. Given the focus of the LEAPS project in Pakistan, we also present the 
gap between private and government schools. In India, the data do not allow us to look either at 
the difference across private and government schools or across schools in the same village (there 
is currently no dataset that allows us to replicate the Pakistani analysis). A useful characterization 
though, is the difference across districts; despite the lack of comparability with the Pakistani 
geographical decomposition the results have independent implications for the design of future 
monitoring systems. 
 
The technical issue is what test scores to use in the subgroup decompositions. One problem with 
the most natural candidate—the percentage of questions correctly answered in the test—is that 
the measured gap depends on the structure of the test. An example illustrates. Consider a test 
where there are ten questions on single-digit addition, five questions on double-digit addition and 
five questions on fractions. A child who knows single-digit addition will score 50 percent on the 
test, one who knows double-digit addition scores 75 percent and one who knows fractions 100 
percent. Using the percentage of correct questions leads us to conclude, somewhat erroneously, 
that the gap between the first and the second child (25 percent) is identical to that between the 
second and the third child (also 25 percent), whereas its likely that the knowledge-gap between 
the second and third child (who can correctly answer questions on fractions) is a lot more than 
between the first and the second. Studies of learning achievement in low-income countries typi-
cally report results using a “standardized” version of the percentage correct (i.e., subtracting the 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation), but this approach suffers from the same problems.  
 
The established norm in all test-score reporting in the United States or in international tests such 
as the TIMSS is to weight questions by their difficulty. Continuing with the example above, if the 
single-digit questions are weighted as “very easy”, the double-digit as “easy” and the fractions as 
“very hard”, the weighted averages scores the child who completes the fractions much higher 
compared to one who completes the double-digit addition. The process of assigning these weights      
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and computing weighted test scores is known as Item Response Theory, and we use these methods 
to normalize our test results.  
 
Knowledge gaps are then presented on a “knowledge scale”, where the average child scores 500, 
the worst child scores 0 and the best 1,000. The distribution has a standard deviation of 150, so 
that a child who scores 350 is one standard-deviation below the average. In addition, the weight-
ing ensures that the difference in “knowledge” between a child who scores 300 and one who 
scores 400 is identical to that between a child who scores 700 and one who scores 800.  
 
Table 6 shows what these different knowledge scores mean in terms of actual learning. For 
instance, a child at the mean of the knowledge-scale distribution (with a score of 500) can add 
two single-digit numbers in mathematics, complete alphabets in English and recognize simple 
words in Urdu. A child with a knowledge score of 200 (2 standard deviations below) can barely 
count, may be able to recognize one or two English alphabets, and can write the Urdu alphabet. A 
child with a knowledge score of 800, can add, subtract, multiply, and divide large numbers and 
can understand, although not fully manipulate, fractions. 
 
5.1. Gaps due to Immutable Characteristics: Household Characteristics 
Part of the gap in learning between children from poor and rich households could arise due to 
variation in parental income. However, parents of children in richer households are also likely to 
be more educated and the children are more likely to be enrolled in private schools. We thus 
present two types of learning gaps—unadjusted and adjusted—which differ in how they account 
for observable differences between children with different family backgrounds.  
 
The unadjusted gap is the difference in the knowledge score between children from different 
family backgrounds. The adjusted gap is based on a regression of the knowledge score on ob-
servable attributes of the child and the household they come from (Table A1, Table A2). This 
regression includes the literacy of the parents, the school that the child is studying in (school 
fixed-effects), and the gender and age of the child. The adjusted gap is the coefficient of the 
relevant attribute in this regression. The interpretation suggests the extent to which two children 
with the same observable characteristics (controlled for in the regression) and studying in the 
same school still exhibit a difference in their learning due to (say) differences in parental wealth.  
 
The unadjusted gaps are consistent with patterns we may expect a priori.      
  - 16 - 
 
•  Children from richer families report higher test scores and the differences are larger for 
language and lower for mathematics: richer children report test scores that are 70 points 
higher on the knowledge scale in English (just below 0.5 standard deviations) and 40 




•  Children whose parents are literate report higher scores. Consistent with a large literature 
on the relative effects of father’s and mother’s education, the differences between chil-
dren with literate and illiterate mothers are higher than those between children with liter-
ate and illiterate fathers. There are some differences in the patterns across subjects 
(Figure 1). The largest gaps across literate and illiterate parents are for English (48 points 
for fathers and 58 points for mothers) and the lowest for Mathematics (33 and 38 points, 
respectively).  
 
•  Females report lower scores than males for Mathematics (10 points or 0.06 standard de-
viations), but they are better in English and Urdu, and are worse in Hindi in India. Again, 
these gaps are small, accounting on average for a 10-point difference (English) and a 
maximum difference of 28 points in the case of Urdu (Figure 1). 
 
•  The results from India largely mirror those from Pakistan (Figure 2). Children from richer 
households report higher scores, but the difference is lower than in Pakistan (30 points or 
0.2 standard deviations in Hindi and 28 points in mathematics. Children with more edu-
cated parents also report higher scores, although in India the gaps are larger for Mathe-
matics than Hindi for differences by father’s literacy and the same for differences by 
mother’s literacy—these gaps are small in absolute magnitude compared to those in Paki-
stan (10 points for father’s literacy in Mathematics and 0 for Hindi, and 20 points for 
both subjects for mother’s literacy). There is some evidence of gender-gaps in India, al-
though, unlike Pakistan, girls report worse scores for both Mathematics and English. 
 
These gaps disappear or reduce sharply (with some exceptions) in a multivariate context, and 
once we control for the school that the child is attending. That is, the gaps between the rich/poor 
                                                      
15 In Pakistan, wealth is measured through an asset index following Filmer and others (2004). In India, 
households are classified according to whether they have above or below median land holding (the latter 
includes landless households).      
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or children with literate/illiterate parents arise primarily because children are going to different 
schools—if we compare two children from different households studying in the same school, 
these gaps are small and insignificant (Figure 1, Figure 2). 
 
•  For parental wealth, the learning gaps are never more than 15 points or 0.10 standard de-
viations (Urdu, Pakistan) once look at the difference between two children in the same 
school with different parental wealth and control for other child and parental characteris-
tics in a multivariate regression. 
 
•  Similar patterns hold for differences by father’s literacy and mother’s literacy for Paki-
stan; in the case of India, the effect of father’s literacy drops to 0 for Mathematics and –5 
points for Hindi, but mother’s literacy remains as important. 
 
•  In contrast, the adjusted and unadjusted gender gaps are very similar with girls perform-
ing worse in both subjects for India, and better in all subjects for Pakistan, particularly for 
Urdu and English. 
 
The data from Pakistan offer a unique opportunity to shed some light on the differences between 
public and private schools in rural areas—a topic that is often debated and remarked upon in the 
popular press and media reports. One popular perception is that of private schools as “fly-by-
night” operators that survive because parents are illiterate and easily influenced. In contrast to this 
view, the data show a large and significant difference in both the unadjusted and adjusted gaps for 
all subjects between private and public schools (Figure 3). These gaps are largest for English, 
where private schools outperform public schools by 150 knowledge points, or almost one stan-
dard deviation, but they are also large for Urdu (100 points) and mathematics (75 points). Surpris-
ingly, there is almost no decrease in the gap once we control for family wealth, parental literacy, 
the age and gender of the child and the village that the school is located in.  
 
Three simple comparisons highlight the dramatic difference in scores between public and private 
schools: 
•  The adjusted gap between public and private schools in English is 12 times the adjusted 
gap between rich and poor children. 
 
•  The adjusted gap between public and private schools in Mathematics is 8 times the ad-
justed gap between children with literate and illiterate fathers.      
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•  The adjusted gap between public and private schools in Urdu is 18 times the adjusted gap 
between children with literate and illiterate mothers. 
 
That across the two countries and in all subjects, there is a clear decline in the relevance of socio-
economic characteristics once we control for the school that the child attends suggests that it is 
the school that matters. Clearly in the case of Pakistan, the learning-gap between private and 
public schools dwarves differences across children from different backgrounds. This is by no 
means a foregone conclusion: in most studies of high-income countries, the ability of differences 
across schools to explain differences in test-scores is smaller  than that of differences across 
households (OECD 2005). 
 
A priori¸ it also appears that there are differences among government schools and among private 
schools. Casual observation suggests that private schools range from elite institutions to tempo-
rary schools run by a local high school graduate seeking supplemental income. Likewise, gov-
ernment schools sometimes appear well-managed and staffed but just as often appear dilapidated 
and mismanaged. These observations suggest that gaps between the best and worst schools within 
each type may be just as important as the gaps between each type. 
 
5.2. Gaps across Schools and Geographical Entities 
This section confirms the substantial differences across schools, with tremendous variation in 
learning achievement across the worst and best government and private schools. Continuing with 
the attempt to contextualize the results from Pakistan within a broader South-Asian context, we 
present similar results on differences across schools for India. The patterns, though, are not 
strictly comparable due to different sampling strategies (in India there are multiple districts, but 
one sampled school in every village; in Pakistan there are many sampled schools in every village, 
but only three districts). For the Pakistani data, we show that there are bad and good schools in 
every village, so that most variation in learning is driven by differences across schools in the 
same village. In India, there is currently no data that allows us to analyze differences across 
schools within the same village. We confirm though, that there are large differences across 
schools and that differences across districts are important. Villages in the same district report 
similar scores, but learning achievements are very different across sampled districts.  
 
Figure 4 highlights these differences. For Pakistan we ranked villages by average mathematics      
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scores and took the 5
th best and the 5
th worst village (with a total of 112, this corresponds roughly 
to the 5
th and 95
th percentiles of the distribution). The 5
th worst village had 10 schools; the 5
th best 
had four. We then computed average mathematics scores for every school in each of these two 
villages and plotted these scores. Several patterns are remarkable. 
 
First, although there is considerable difference in average mathematics scores in the two villages 
this does not imply that all schools in the “bad” village are worse than all schools in the “good” 
village. In fact, it is the opposite—of 10 schools in the “bad” village, 7 are better than the worst 
school in the “good” village. Of the 14 schools in these two villages, 10 are in the region of 
“overlap”: That is, the majority of schools in the “bad” village perform similarly to the schools in 
the “good” village. Only the two worst schools in the “bad” village and two best schools in the 
“good” village do not have counterparts.  
 
Second, government schools clearly under-perform private schools (marked as triangles) on 
average in both villages. However, the mean comparison does not imply that all government 
schools are worse than all private schools—in the “bad” village, four government schools are 
better than the worst private school, and the top performing school is government rather than 
private. At the same time, the worst schools are also run by the government so that the four worst 
schools in the “bad” village are all government-run, and the bottom-of-the-pile schools are truly 
dismal—with an average score below 100, children in this school can barely count after four 
years of education. 
 
Third, the differences in math scores across schools in the same village are orders of magnitude 
larger than the differences in math scores across children with varying socioeconomic back-
grounds. In the “bad” village, the difference between the worst and best-performing school is 500 
knowledge points (more than 4 standard-deviations) and in the “good” village more than 400 
knowledge points (3.3 standard deviations). The single largest unadjusted gap in mathematics 
score by socioeconomic status is across children from less and more wealthy backgrounds with 
the wealthy reporting mathematics scores that are 40 knowledge points higher on average. The 
unadjusted difference between the best and worst school in the same village is 12 times this 
difference in the “bad” village and 10 times this difference in the “good” village. 
 
For India, we cannot repeat this exercise at the level of the village. However, a similar compari-
son at the level of the district (recall that in India one school was picked at random from each      
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village, but five gram panchayats were surveyed in each of 30 districts) is instructive, both to 
understand whether the large differences across schools are particular to Pakistan and to under-
stand the extent of district-level variation in the data (something we cannot say much about in 
Pakistan given that 3 districts were sampled). For a comparable exercise, we first ranked districts 
according to the average mathematics score of children in the district. Corresponding to the 5
th 
and 95
th percentile of the distribution, we then chose the 2
nd best and 2
nd worst district and com-
puted village-level school scores (with one school sampled in every village, this is identical to 
school-level scores) for each of the five villages within the district. These are plotted in the first 
panel of Figure 4. 
 
Similar to the data from Pakistan, differences across schools are large, both in absolute terms and 
when compared to differences by socio-economic characteristics. In the “bad” district, the differ-
ence between the best and the worst school is 200 knowledge points and in the “good” district 
104 knowledge points. This is 8 times/4 times the unadjusted wealth-gap and 10 times/ 5 times the 
unadjusted gap by maternal literacy in the good/bad district respectively. 
 
Unlike comparisons across villages in Pakistan, in India all the schools in the “bad” district are 
indeed worse than all the schools in the “good” district. There is no overlap, and the difference 
between the worst school in the “good” district and the best school in the “bad” district is 134 
knowledge-points (almost one standard-deviation) or six times the unadjusted gap between chil-
dren with literate and illiterate mothers. Neither is this a characteristic of the extremes of the 
distribution—indeed, out of 40 districts, we need to go to the 6
th best and the 8
th worst districts 
before we find a single overlapping school (roughly the 85
th and 20
th percentiles). Clearly, the 
language of “bad” and “good” geographical regions with respect to learning resonates in India, 
but not in the Punjab province of Pakistan, at least in terms of villages. 
 
We can replicate this exercise using the data from the full sample rather than two villages in each 
country. One way the educational literature has approached this issue is through a “variance-
decomposition” exercise, which asks how much of the total variation in test scores can be ex-
plained by district, village, and school characteristics, with the residual attributed to differences 
across children and noise in the data. A simple version of this ANOVA decomposition sequen-
tially regresses test scores on district, village, and school dummies; the residual variation is 
assumed to be driven by differences across children and unexplained variation in the data. 
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For both Pakistan and India, 50 percent of the total variation can be explained by variation across 
schools. District, village, and school effects are stronger for English (Pakistan) and Hindi (India) 
where they account for more than 60 percent of the total variation; they are weakest for Mathe-
matics (India) and Urdu (Pakistan), though they still account for one-half of the total variation. In 
fact, child and household characteristics such as age, gender, parental literacy, and wealth add 
little explanatory power: with a full set of household and child covariates, and a school fixed 
effect, total explained variation never exceeds 68 percent. This is large compared to what has 
been found in other countries. The average variation across schools in 29 OECD countries, for 
instance, is 33 percent and only 6 countries (Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands and Turkey) report between school variation above 50 percent in Mathematics (OECD 
2005). 
 
Consistent with the finding that there are no “good” or “bad” villages, the portion of variation 
attributable to villages in Pakistan is small; for all subjects it accounts for less than 15 percent of 
the total variation. In contrast, district effects in India are large. One-third of all variation in test 
scores is governed by the district that the child is studying in; the effect of the specific Gram 
Panchayat in a particular district is somewhat smaller (around 15 percent). 
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 present another way of looking at the same problem. We first regress test 
scores on village dummies and then plot the residuals—this is a measure of how much of the 
variation is accounted for by villages. We then add in family characteristics and plot the residuals 
again; finally we repeat the exercise with school dummies (in India, we proceed with district 
dummies, village dummies, and family dummies). To the extent that schools or villages explain a 
large portion of the variation in the test-score data, we expect that residual plot to be more “con-
centrated” once the appropriate dummies are accounted for. So, if districts matter a lot, we expect 
the residual plot from a regression of test scores on district dummies to be “tighter” than the 
distribution of all test scores. 
 
A familiar story emerges. In Pakistan, the residual plot is slightly more concentrated once we 
include village dummies. Augmenting village dummies with child characteristics (wealth, paren-
tal literacy, age, and gender) smooth’s out the distribution around the left-tail but a further con-
centration is hard to pick up through a visual inspection alone (although the variance does drop 
somewhat). Once school dummies are included, the picture changes dramatically—for all three 
subjects there is a substantial reduction in the variance of the residual plot and these effects are      
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most pronounced for English and Mathematics, and less so for Urdu. In India, the tightening 
happens early on at the level of the district, and further controls for the village/school and family 
characteristics does decrease the variance, but there are no dramatic reductions (as an aside, note 
that the Hindi test was too hard—there are a large number of children at the extreme left of the 
distribution, and these seem to be concentrated in a handful of districts). 
 
Based on these figures, Table 7 reports the 5
th percentile, the median, and the 95
th percentile of 
test scores, averaged at the school level for English, Mathematics, and Urdu, and for public and 
private schools in Pakistan.
16 While patterns are somewhat different across subjects, three mes-
sages emerge: 
 
•  In all subjects, the best schools are private. The “top” government schools come closest 
to the “top” private schools in Mathematics; they are further behind in Urdu and signifi-
cantly behind in English, where the median private school is roughly equivalent to the top 
5
th percentile of government schools. 
 
•  The worst schools are always government schools, and by large margins in all three sub-
jects. For mathematics and Urdu, the worst private schools outperform the worst govern-
ment schools by 100 knowledge points (1.5 to 2.5 times the unadjusted wealth gap in Ur-
du and mathematics, respectively). For English, the equivalent difference is 300 knowl-
edge points or more than 3 times the unadjusted wealth gap. 
 
•  The variation in private schools is always less than the variation in government schools. 
That is, if we look at the difference between the “top” performing and “worst” perform-
ing government schools, this difference is greater than the equivalent difference for pri-
vate schools. For Mathematics and Urdu, the range of knowledge points between the bot-
tom 5
th percentile and top 95
th percentile of private schools is 300 compared to 350 for 
government schools; for English its 200 in private schools compared to 450 in govern-
ment schools.  
 
                                                      
16 These decompositions should be viewed as a heuristic device only, since quantiles can only be recovered 
if the first stage regression encompasses the entire distribution rather than the expectation. Regressions are 
mean-unbiased, but do not necessarily allow us to recover unbiased quantiles presented in Table 7.      
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5.3. Discussion 
Improving educational outcomes remains one of the key development challenges for Pakistan. 
While efforts to raise enrollment and retention rates must continue, the results reported here 
reiterate that enrollment and retention are only one measure of education. Enrollment and reten-
tion do not guarantee actual learning. Overall achievement is low and the gaps in achievement 
across schools are large. In contrast to popular writing on education in Pakistan and India, the 
levels of learning and the structure of the educational gaps are very similar in the two countries; if 
corroborated by representative and standardized tests, this would suggest that increasing learning 
is a difficult challenge across both countries. 
 
In terms of total learning, children in the third grade in Pakistan can barely read and write or 
perform the simplest arithmetic operations such as counting and addition. More difficult but 
equally crucial skills such as forming a complete sentence given a word and solving more com-
plicated multiplication and divisions problems are out of reach of all but a few children. House-
holds characteristics are associated with achievement along the dimensions expected—children 
from richer and more educated families perform better—but these differences largely vanish after 
controlling for all the household characteristics and, in particular, the school in which the child is 
enrolled.  
 
The most striking gaps arise not between children but between schools in the same village. Pri-
vate schools score significantly higher than government schools, even after controlling for char-
acteristics of the student population. But there are large variations within government schools. 
Even in villages with a great number of poorly performing schools there is usually one school that 
performs well. While the best schools are not always private schools, the worst schools are almost 
exclusively government schools. These dismally performing government schools often record 
achievement levels so low that the pupils tested must have virtually no cumulated knowledge or 
skills after four years of education. 
 
At the very least, the findings point to the need for consistent evaluation of learning in Indian and 
Pakistani schools with some documentation of the learning-gaps across households and schools. 
The literature review highlights how different methodologies, the non-comparability of tests 
given at different points in time, and lack of uniformity in the data collected make it difficult to 
discern trends in learning over time and the changes in learning-gaps across households and tests. 
While this is increasingly recognized in both India and Pakistan (the ASER tests by Pratham in      
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India and discussions in Pakistan about the National Assessment and Educational System), a 
uniform and easily accessible methodology would allow both official and unofficial bodies to 
produce consistent data over time and regions. 
 
A systematic assessment would enable comparisons across households, children, schools and 
geographical locations. The findings from Pakistan show large differences across government 
schools in the same village. Typically studies test children from only one school in every village. 
While this is valid when there are a small number of schools, administrative data on school-
supply in Pakistan suggest that even in rural Sindh, a province with one of the worst educational 
outcomes, there are close to six government schools in every village. To enable meaningful 
comparisons over time, we suggest that periodic tests satisfy three requirements. 
 
•  First, design the test to be norm, rather than criterion-based (that is, the test is informa-
tive about where children are on an overall scale, rather than designed to check whether 
children have achieved one type of competency). One problem with tests in low-income 
countries is that they are designed around a curriculum suitable for the grade-level the 
child is in. Typically, children are three to four grade-levels below the curriculum. Con-
sequently, tests are relatively uninformative about what children actually know. Norm 
based tests, with a list of questions available for test-designers, allow meaningful com-
parisons of what children know even when they perform below their grade-levels. 
•  Second, collect basic child characteristics along with the test. At the minimum, data on 
parental education, some indicator of wealth (children in third grade were able to accu-
rately answer questions about household assets such as radios or televisions), child gen-
der and age should be available to researchers so that gaps across these observable di-
mensions can be monitored carefully. 
•  Finally, allow for variations across districts and across schools in the same village in the 
sampling strategy. Our findings suggest it is necessary to include at least two to three 
schools in every village, two to three villages in every district and a large number of dis-
tricts. The Pakistan study is the first that tests children in multiple public and private 
schools within the same village, but suffers from the small number of study-districts; 
conversely, tests in India assess learning across villages but seldom sample more than 
one school in every village. 
 
On a substantive note, large differences across schools are consistent with two (broad) explana-     
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tions. These differences could reflect student sorting rather than school quality. Although the 
adjusted gap across schools controls for observable socioeconomic characteristics, variables 
unobserved by researchers (such as child-ability/motivation or parental investment) play an 
equally important role. If children in private schools are more “able” than in government schools, 
this would explain a fraction of the observed gap in Pakistan. Similarly, differences in unobserved 
child characteristics are consistent with the variation within government schools in both India and 
Pakistan—these could reflect (unobserved) differences in the student-body rather than school 
quality. 
 
A similar question of “selection on ability” confounds the interpretation of the small gender gaps 
in test scores. Given large gender gaps in enrollments (particularly in Pakistan) there are two 
potential interpretations for why similar gender-gaps do not arise in test scores. One possibility is 
that parents send only the most “intelligent” or “able” girls to schools, so that the average (unob-
served) ability of an enrolled girl is higher than that of an enrolled boy. A second possibility is 
that the gender gaps in enrollment do not translate into differential household inputs into school-
ing across boys and girls once they are enrolled. That is, parents differentially enroll girls less 
than boys, but once they have decided to enroll them, spend as much time and money on both. 
 
The observed patterns could also reflect variation in the quality of schooling rather than in the 
student body. These could either reflect school facilities and physical infrastructure, management 
styles and the influence of the head-teacher, or the teaching imparted by teachers themselves. 
Although the educational literature is generally inconclusive about the importance of school 
facilities and head-teachers, there is consistent evidence that teachers matter (unfortunately, we 
don’t know what it is about teachers that matter).  
 
In ongoing research, we document that variation in physical infrastructure across schools does not 
follow the same patterns as learning. In Pakistan, there is a marginal difference in infrastructure 
across private and public schools. In India, there is no difference in learning in schools with good 
and bad infrastructure; neither are there systematic differences in learning across schools with 
high and low student-teacher ratios (Figure 7). In stark contrast, the presence or absence of teach-
ers in school and what they do when they are there is strongly associated with test scores—in 
India, schools where the average fraction of teachers actively engaged in teaching was high (more 
than 50 percent) report 75 more knowledge points in both Mathematics and Hindi tests (Figure 7). 
In Pakistan there is a clear difference in teacher effort measured through absences in public and      
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private schools: the former are absent 3.2 days a month compared to 1.8 days a month for teach-
ers in private schools. 
 
Similar results regarding learning and teacher effort (usually measured through teacher absence) 
have been documented in recent research (Duflo and Hanna 2005; Pandey 2005). If these learning 
gaps truly reflect differences in teacher effort, they raise important puzzles and questions that 
may govern how (and whether) these two countries can appreciably improve the quality of human 
capital. 
6.  Three Puzzles and Questions for Further Research 
The first puzzle is the variation across government schools. Is this governed by teacher character-
istics and effort? In private schools, Andrabi and others (2006) document that pay is linked to 
performance. Teachers who are more competent (as measured through their test scores and educa-
tion) and teachers who are more absent are paid less. In contrast, government teachers in both 
countries are paid according to a fixed-salary scale that rewards experience and training, but little 
else. And they cannot be fired. Given that there are few differences in performance incentives for 
government teachers, why are test-scores so different across government schools? 
 
There are two possible explanations. One is that teachers respond to the environment that they are 
in. A recent review of teacher absenteeism by Chaudhury and others (2006) finds that teacher 
absences respond (negatively) to better school infrastructure and local monitoring and (positively) 
to poverty in the local area. In Zambia (Das and others 2005) a large fraction of teacher absences 
are due to sickness arising from high HIV infection rates in the population. Given these complex 
and overlapping conditions, it is critical to understand to what extent better working conditions 
(better infrastructure, better healthcare and living conditions) and better monitoring or incentives 
can lead to higher teacher effort in government schools.  
 
The second explanation is that unobserved fixed teacher characteristics such as motivation mat-
ter—some teachers are highly motivated and altruistic, others are not. In related work on Paki-
stan, we document that teacher qualifications and training are lower in private compared to public 
schools, but turnover is much higher among the former, suggesting that private schools may be 
better able to fire teachers with low levels of intrinsic motivation. Depending on the relative 
importance of these two explanations, the policy implications are very different. If teacher per-
formance responds to the environment and to incentives, changing these to elicit higher effort will      
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lead to better performance. However, if fixed characteristics account for some fraction of the 
variation in learning, the correct policy response is to allow more flexibility in hiring and firing 
teachers based on their initial performance.  
  
The second puzzle is why children in Pakistani villages don’t go to the better government schools 
in the village, given that there are good and bad government schools in every village. There are 
no residential restrictions on what schools children can attend, no admission restrictions either in 
public or private schools and out-of-pocket expenditures are identical across different government 
schools (there are no PTA fees, for instance). By sending their children to better schools in the 
same village, parents will reap the benefits of a better education later on. How to square the 
school choices of children in Pakistani villages with standard economic theory is not obvious: for 
instance, if it were the case that certain government schools are in the outskirts and attended only 
by the poor, while others are in the center and attended by the rich, we should see a large drop in 
the learning gap once we account for student wealth, but we do not. Understanding the limits to 
arbitrage in these rural contexts could shed light on what parents expect from schools, and what 
constrains them in their search for a better education. 
 
A third puzzle centers on variation in teacher effort across districts in India. Earlier work by 
Kremer and others (2005) links higher teacher absenteeism with poorer districts, older teachers, 
permanent contracts, and local incentives such as paved roads and recent inspections. Recent 
research by Banerjee and Somanathan (2005) and Pandey (2005) points to a political economy–
based explanation, whereby the potential for participation by the poor and the low caste, who are 
the main users of public schools, is lower in districts where there is greater concentration of 
power in the hands of the elite. Understanding how teacher accountability and effort can be 
improved in such a setting will be critical for India’s future.       
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2062 2665 4771 4125  Village Population 
(16) (49)  (129)  (228) 
37 34 45 42  Percent Adult Literacy 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)  1.0 
6.88 7.15 7.19 7.15  Household Size 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10) 
1639 1581 1864 1891  Village Area (Acres) 
(19) (19) (30) (93) 
0.019 0.021 0.025 0.021  Fraction Houses with Potable 
Water  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
0.097 0.086 0.110 (0.103  Fraction Houses with Electricity 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
0.521 0.503 0.642 0.647)  Fraction Pacca (Cement) Houses 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.022) 
0.39 0.43 1.96 1.68  Number of Private Schools in 
Village  (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.11) 
2.33 2.71 3.43 2.95  Number of Government Schools 
in Village  (0.01) (0.05) (0.12) (0.20) 
Notes: Cells contain means for the subsample of villages listed in the column heading. Parentheses contain the 
standard error of the mean. The statistics are based on the Census of Villages from the Population Census 
Organization (1998). ATK, FSD and RYK are Attock, Faisalabad, and Rahim Yar Khan districts, respectively. 
The 112 LEAPS sample villages were drawn randomly (stratified by district) from the villages in Column 3. 
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TABLE 3. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLED VILLAGES (INDIA): N=200 
Variable Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Distance from nearest pucca (mortar) road (kilometer)  2.12  3.00 
Village area (hectares)  706   718  
Population size  2035  1419 
Literacy rate  0.35  0.12 
Fraction of scheduled caste and tribe population  0.28  0.16 
Number of government primary schools  2.01  1.16 
Number of private primary schools  0.88  1.23 
Note: The population, village area and literacy rate variables are from the Census of India, 2001. The remaining 
variables are from the data collected by the authors. 
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TABLE 4. COMPARING QUESTIONS AND PERFORMANCE ON SIMILAR EXAM QUESTIONS 
Exam Question  India  Pakistan  India  Pakistan 
Complete the addition problem:  55+12  36+61  87%  86% 
Complete the subtraction problem: 640-112  238-129  53% 32% 
 8803-4213    39%   
Complete the multiplication problem: 2*11  4*32  77%  50% 
 12*45    50%   
Complete a sentence with the word:  Home  Beautiful  41%  33% 
 Message  School  27%  31% 
Notes: This table presents several questions from the Pakistan and India exams that are roughly comparable. 
The third and fourth columns state the actual question. The fourth and fifth column shows the percentage of 
students who answered the question correctly. This table is meant to show absolute not relative level of per-
formance. The questions, while comparable, are not equivalent, and class three children were tested in Pakistan 
compared to class four children in India.      
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TABLE 5. MORE DETAILED RESULTS FOR PAKISTAN EXAM 
Subject  The Question  Percentage who answered correctly 
 










Mathematics  4 + 6  89  87  92  K & I 
Mathematics  36 + 61  86  84  90  K & I 
Mathematics  8 – 3  65  63  71  K & I 
Mathematics  5 x 4  59  55  67  II 
Mathematics  238 - 129  32  29  39  II 
Mathematics  Read and Write the time 
(Clock shows 3:40)  24 21  31 II 
Mathematics  384 ÷ 6  19 17  24  III 
Mathematics  4 x 32  50  46  59  III 
Mathematics  Fractions: ½ + 3/2    19  17  22  III 
Mathematics  Read a diagram of a scale to 
answer which part is heavier 12 11  14  III 
Mathematics  Fractions: 7/5 – ¾  1  1  1  IV 
English  Write the letter “D” (spoken 
out loud)  86 82  93   
English  Fill in the right letter D _ F  70  62  87   
English  Tick the correct answer to 
match the picture (picture of 
book) 
70 61  89   
English  Fill in the missing letters 
(picture of a ball) BA _ _  45 35  69   
English  Fill in the missing letters 
(picture of a flag) F L A _  29 20  48   
Urdu  Tick the correct answer to 
match the picture (picture of 
house)  52 48  61   
Urdu  Tick the correct answer to 
match the picture (picture of 
book) 
73 69  82   
Urdu  Write a sentence with the 
word “beautiful”  33 27  49   
Urdu  Write a sentence with the 
word “school”  31 24  46   
Notes: Questions are from the Pakistan LEAPS exam. Columns 3, 4, and 5 report the percentage of children 
who answered the question correctly in all schools, government schools, and private schools.      
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TABLE 6. KNOWLEDGE SCORES AND ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE 
     India  Pakistan 
      Knowledge Points  Knowledge Points 
Exam  Question  India  Pakistan  350 500 650 350 500    650 
Complete the addition 
problem:  55+12  36+61  80 94 98 76 89 95 
Complete the subtrac-
tion problem:  640-112  238-129  8  51 92 11 28 55 
  8803-4213    4  29  81  - - - 
Complete the multiplica-
tion problem:  2*11  4*32  42 87 98 22 49 77 
  12*45    8  44  88  - - - 
Complete a sentence 
with the word:  Home Beautiful 2 27  89 2 15  78 
  Message School  4 36  90 1 10  76 
Notes: Cells contain the likelihood a child with the score given in the column heading would answer the ques-
tion given in the row correctly. The knowledge points 350, 500, and 650 represent the mean score (500) and ± 
one standard deviation (150). 
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Source: LEAPS Exam, 2004
Unadjusted Gap Adjusted Gap
Notes:  Gaps are mean differences: (rich – poor), (literate father – illiterate father), (literate mother – illiterate 
mother), and (female – male). Rich and poor are the top and bottom third of an asset index calculated using princi-
pal components analysis. The adjusted gaps are the coefficients from an OLS regression that includes wealth, father 
literacy, mother literacy, gender, age, age squared, and a school fixed effect (Tables A1 and A2). 
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Source: UP/MP Exam, 2004
Unadjusted Gap Adjusted Gap
Notes: Gaps are mean differences in the knowledge score defined as: (rich – poor), (literate father – illiterate father), 
(literate mother – illiterate mother), and (female – male). Rich and poor are defined as families having above or below 
median land holdings. The adjusted gaps are the coefficients from an OLS regression that includes wealth (land 
holding), father literacy, mother literacy, gender, age, age squared, upper caste, backward caste, and a school fixed 
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Source: LEAPS Exam, 2004
School Type (Pakistan)
Unadjusted Gap Adjusted Gap
 
Note: School type gaps are mean differences between children in private schools and government schools. The 
adjusted gap for Pakistan is the coefficient on private school in a child level OLS regression that includes 
wealth, father literacy, mother literacy, gender, age, age squared, and a village fixed effect.      
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The 2nd Worst District The 2nd Best District















The 5th Worst Village The 5th Best Village
Source: LEAPS Exam, 2004
Pakistan
Government Private
Notes: The first panel shows average Mathematics scores for schools in the 2nd best and 2nd worst districts in the 
UP/MP exam data. The second panel shows the average scores for schools in the 5th best and 5th worst villages in 
the LEAPS Mathematics exam data. The dotted line splits the two villages and districts, but the ordering of 
schools on the x-axis is otherwise irrelevant. Private schools were note tested in India.      
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with same family characteristics
In same school
Source: LEAPS Exam, 2004
English Scores: Actual and Counterfactuals
What Would Happen if Children Were...
Notes: Panel 1 shows the distribution of English knowledge scores on the LEAPS exam. Panel 2 shows the 
residual distribution controlling for a village fixed effect. Panel 3 shows the residual distribution controlling for a 
village fixed effect and child age, age squared, gender, mother literacy, father literacy, and household wealth. Panel 
4 shows the residual distribution including an additional school fixed effect. 
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with same family characteristics
In same school
Source: UP/MP Exam, 2004
Math Scores: Actual and Counterfactuals
What Would Happen if Children Were...
Notes: Panel 1 shows the distribution of math knowledge scores on the UP/MP exam. Panel 2 shows the residual 
distribution controlling for a district fixed effect. Panel 3 shows the residual distribution controlling for a district 
fixed effect and child age, age squared, gender, caste, mother literacy, father literacy, and household wealth. Panel 
4 shows the residual distribution including an additional school fixed effect. 
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TABLE 7. ADJUSTED AND UNADJUSTED SCHOOL KNOWLEDGE SCORE DISTRIBUTIONS 
    Private Schools  Government Schools 








5th  Percentile  394  388 288 312 






95th  Percentile  703  691 651 642 
5th  Percentile  411  401 294 329 






95th  Percentile  705  688 631 623 
5th  Percentile  488  460 226 275 









95th  Percentile  725  714 620 610 
Notes: Cells contain average school scores. Adjusted scores control for a village fixed effect, age, age squared, 
gender, wealth, mother literacy, and father literacy. This table is a heuristic rather than analytically accurate, 
since regressions identify only the conditional mean and not separate quantiles of the distribution. 
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FIGURE 7. ADJUSTED AND UNADJUSTED KNOWLEDGE SCORE GAPS BY SCHOOL 













































Source: UP/MP Exam, 2004
Unadjusted Gap Adjusted Gap
Notes: The infrastructure index is a sum of four indicator variables – whether the school has a pucca (cement and brick) 
building, drinking water, toilet facility and a playground. The gap is between schools above and below the median of 
this index. Small class size is 50 and large is above 50. The gap is small minus large. Results look similar if class size is 
split at 40. Schools with active teachers (teacher effort) are those where 50 percent or more of the teachers are engaged 
is teaching at the time of survey visits. The gap is high effort minus low effort. The adjusted gaps is the coefficient on 
variable of interest from an OLS regression that includes wealth (land holding), father literacy, mother literacy, gender, 
age, age squared, upper caste, backward caste, school infrastructure, class size, and teacher effort.  
      





TABLE A1. OLS REGRESSION USED TO COMPUTE ADJUSTED KNOWLEDGE 
SCORES (PAKISTAN) 
  School Fixed Effect  Village Fixed Effect + Private 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent  Variable Math  Urdu English Math  Urdu  English 
Female 4.0  26.1*  18.2*  -9.9*  28.6*  17.9* 
 (4.6)  (4.6)  (3.8)  (3.6) (3.5) (3.2) 
Age 0.6  -6.7** -0.1  3.3  -3.9  0.8 
 (2.7)  (2.7)  (2.3)  (3.0) (3.0) (2.8) 
Age-squared -0.0  0.1  -0.0  -0.1  0.1  -0.0 
 (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Mother Literate  4.3  4.9  7.3**  3.0  4.4  7.6+ 
 (4.0)  (4.1)  (3.4)  (4.6) (4.5) (4.2) 
Father Literate  8.7*  10.7* 7.3*  12.9* 15.8*  13.7* 
 (3.3)  (3.3)  (2.8)  (3.8) (3.7) (3.5) 
Middle Wealth  7.3+  12.8*  3.7  7.0  13.4*  5.2 
 (3.7)  (3.8)  (3.1)  (4.4) (4.3) (4.0) 
High Wealth  7.0+  15.2*  12.2*  18.1*  29.0*  26.7* 
 (4.1)  (4.1)  (3.4)  (4.7) (4.6) (4.3) 
Private School        72.7*  91.5*  143.3* 
       (4.1)  (4.0)  (3.7) 
Constant 487.8* 530.5* 491.8*  439.4*  465.0*  422.8* 
 (18.4)  (18.8)  (15.5)  (20.0) (19.5) (18.1) 
Fixed Effect  School School School Village  Village  Village 
Observations 6347  6347  6347  6241  6241  6241 
R-squared 0.54  0.53  0.68  0.18  0.23  0.35 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Notes: Dependent variable is child knowledge score for math, Urdu, or English. Data 
from LEAPS Exam, 2004. Sample consists of (up to) 10 randomly selected children per 
school; the OLS regression is not reweighted by the total school population. Wealth is 
calculated using principal components analysis from an asset survey; middle wealth is the 
middle third; high wealth is the top third; the bottom third is omitted. 
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TABLE A2. OLS REGRESSION USED TO COMPUTE ADJUSTED 
KNOWLEDGE SCORES (INDIA) 
 (1)  (2) 
 Math  Hindi 
Female -12.8**  -13.8** 
 (6.0)  (5.4) 
Age -74.8**  6.0 
 (30.4)  (27.6) 
Age-squared 3.4**  -0.3 
 (1.5)  (1.3) 
Mother Literate  23.2*  21.3* 
 (8.3)  (7.5) 
Father Literate  -3.0  -7.8 
 (7.0)  (6.3) 
Rich 10.4  -1.8 
 (7.4)  (6.7) 
Middle Caste  -8.1  -9.0 
 (6.9)  (6.3) 
High Caste  -5.6  0.2 
 (10.3)  (9.3) 
Constant 906.3*  481.0* 
 (155.4)  (140.8) 
Fixed Effect  School  School 
Observations 1479  1479 
R-squared 0.60  0.66 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
Notes: Dependent variable is child knowledge score for math or Hindi. Data 
from UP/MP Exam, 2004. Rich is defined as having above median land 
holdings. High castes are upper castes, middle castes are backward castes and 
the omitted category is low castes who are scheduled castes and tribes. 
 
 
 